Knowledge + Learning = Performance

We're going to try something new starting today. I've added a new category called "PhD Musings" to which I'll be posting some of the assignments and papers from my doctoral coursework. These postings will be on topics that may not have a direct application, or perhaps have a more theoretical perspective, on the topics of knowledge, learning, or performance.

To begin, we'll be exploring the topic of epistemology and the practice of knowledge and learning management. Per my course’s syllabus (Walden University, 2007), we’ll focus on the history of knowledge from the early contributors, including Plato and Aristotle, to contemporary writers. We’ll review the evolution of major movements, including rationalism, empiricism, functionalism, structuralism, and behaviorism and cover contemporary authors involved with knowledge, learning, and change management, including Senge, Drucker, Deming, Nonaka, Garvin, Argyris, Knowles, and Rogers. The focus will “in particular be on one central theme: the relation between the knower and what is known. In particular, we will trace the story of how the mental world and the physical world had been split apart by the ancient Greek philosophers and how epistemologists have addressed that divide up to the present where more holistic accounts of mind and body are now being developed” (Walden University, 2007).

Today we’ll start with some learnings related to Aristotle and Plato. In approaching this topic, I thought it would be interesting to look at both Plato and Aristotle and what they each said to me as a knowledge manager.

After reading Plato, my overall take-away is that a knowledge manager needs to provide opportunities for each individual’s innate knowledge to spring forth. Plato argues that the relation between the knower and what is known is that the knower already possesses the knowledge or can acquire it through mental effort. Therefore, the role of the knowledge manager is to help individuals tap into what they know.

Aristotle, on the other hand, argues that the knower has the ability to gather knowledge through mental processes applied to information (gathered via their senses) based on the world around us. This gathered knowledge can then be used to increase what the knower knows. The implications of this for me as a knowledge manager are to encourage:
- Searching and exploration to find explanations
- Applying each person’s ability to perceive and thus learn or acquire knowledge
- Using these perceptions to then form memories which (once many) can then become experience
- Maximizing this experience to create mastery of new skills or understanding
Overall, that means as a knowledge manager it would be important to utilize methods that will help individuals to explore, remember, and then amass experiences to achieve deeper levels of skill or understanding.

Another question raised by these readings is whether Plato was describing tacit knowledge, which is knowledge that is in our heads, such as rules of thumb or experience. When I was contrasting Plato vs. Aristotle, I began to question if Plato was indeed talking about tacit knowledge. However without reading more of Plato’s work, I’m not sure if Plato’s concept of knowledge could be classified as tacit. The issue is how did the knower gain the knowledge? Consider the following passage from Plato: “…if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes” (p. 274). Plato seemed to argue for knowledge being innate and something that needs to be brought forth.

To return to the question of tacit knowledge, I believe we would need to turn to Polanyi who originally coined the phrase. I’ve not personally read Polanyi, but he is discussed at some length by Nonaka and Takeuchi who explain that Polanyi contended that “human beings acquire knowledge by creating and organizing their own experiences…[and] that human beings create knowledge by involving themselves with objects, that is, through self-involvement and commitment (1995, p.60). In addition, Davenport and Prusak (2000) discuss tacit knowledge as being something gained through personal experience over a long period of time. Contrasting these definitions versus Plato’s reveals that the definition of tacit knowledge may actually be more closely affiliated with Aristotle’s views of how knowledge is acquired. Based on the small excerpt I’ve read of Plato’s work, I’m not sure that he was discussing tacit knowledge as it has come to be understood today, but perhaps indeed he was laying some preliminary groundwork.

My professor, Dr. Folz, also encouraged me to consider “how does a knowledge manager help his colleagues tap into what they know--be it innate or be [it] acquired through the senses? And how does the knowledge manager know what is true and what is not true?” (Folz, 2007). Thus I turn my attention now to the challenges of capturing and codifying knowledge—both explicit and (in particular) tacit knowledge. Nonaka and Takeuchi argue that “knowledge is created through the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge… [which in turn leads to] four different modes of knowledge conversion”—tacit to tacit (socialization), tacit to explicit (externalization), explicit to explicit (combination), and explicit to tacit (internalization) (1995, p. 62). As knowledge managers, we need to facilitate methods and opportunities for these different knowledge conversions to take place. This can include not only tools and processes, but also cultural conditions that encourage innovation and knowledge creation.

I was also particularly intrigued by Dr. Folz’s question of “how does the knowledge manager know what is true and what is not true?” The mechanics may be as simple as a review panel of peers or an identified expert who validates the collected knowledge. However, Dr. Folz had me wondering about the potential of that approach being flawed. For example, if the review panel or experts are from the same company, educational and/or work background, culture, etc. they may share common biases that will potentially diminish the knowledge’s truism. So perhaps the best way to ensure that we come closer to the truth is by actively seeking out others who do not share the same biases. Truth “with a capital T” is likely something one can never be 100% sure of, but that does not mean as knowledge managers we should give up on getting as close as we can.

- Robin

References:

Aristotle. (1993). Posterior analytics (J. Barnes, Trans.). London: Clarendon Press. (Original work published 350 BC)

Davenport, T.H., & Prusak, L. (2000). Working knowledge (Paperback ed.). Boston: Harvard Business School Press. (Original work published 1998)

Folz, B. (2007, September 7). Week 1 Discussion: Robin how does a knowledge manager. Message posted to http://sylvan.live.ecollege.com/ec/crs/default.learn?CourseID=2730355&Survey=1&47=3584905&ClientNodeID=984646&coursenav=1&bhcp=1

Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge creating company. New York: Oxford University Press.

Plato. (1968). Republic (B. Jowett, Trans.). Public Domain. (Original work published 360 BC)

Walden University. (2007). AMDS-8800-01 Epistemology and the practice of knowledge and learning management. In Online syllabus. Retrieved October 1, 2007 from http://sylvan.live.ecollege.com/ec/crs/default.learn?CourseID=2730355&Survey=1&47=3584905&ClientNodeID=984646&coursenav=1&bhcp=1

Copyright Robin Donnan 2007. All Rights Reserved.
Performance Associates, Inc.

In our journey into epistemology we now proceed to the sixteenth and seventeenth century philosophers, Rene Descartes and John Locke. Rationalism is the school of thought that gives human reasoning the primary role in knowing. A key proponent of Rationalism, Descartes was well known for the quote, “Cogito, ergo sum —I think, therefore I am”. Empiricism, in contrast, valued experience. Locke, a strong advocate of Empiricism, gave rise to the concept of the mind being a “tabula rasa” (blank slate / white paper) upon which we add and write our ideas based on experiences and reflections upon that experience. To further explore these philosophers I considered the question of if we do not use our senses, but only our intellect, how can we acquire new knowledge?

If we first look to answering this question from the empiricism perspective of Aristotle and Locke, the answer would be a simple ‘it can not be done.’ Both Aristotle and Locke contended that one can acquire new knowledge only through the senses and accumulating those experiences to form knowledge and skill. For them, knowledge is inductive by nature. Aristotle, who laid the foundation for the scientific method, argued that we use our sensory perception to take in particulars and then use reasoning powers to understand what our senses perceived. Locke argued that the only knowledge humans can have is based on experience (“a posteriori”). In Book I of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he argues against innate knowledge and the Cartesian split between mind and body—beliefs held strongly by the rationalist philosophers. In Book II, Locke then presents his theory of knowledge being one where all knowledge is acquired through either our senses or from reflecting on our experiences in the physical world. Interestingly, Locke still supports the Cartesian Dualism of the mind/body split—even though the mind gathers data from the sensory world, Locke argues that knowledge is an intellectual event still in a world separate from the physical one.

In answering the question of how we can acquire new knowledge, Plato and Descartes on the other hand are proponents of knowledge being acquired through the intellect alone—for they both believed that we are born with innate “a priori” knowledge and can deduce truths through mental reasoning. Proponents of rationalist philosophy, they believed that the intellect could be use to acquire knowledge about everything there is to know—that one merely needs to apply adequate intellectual reflection and study to a subject in order to deduce the truth. Plato argued that ideas are perfect, eternal, and found in the soul and that knowledge is innate and needs only be brought forth. Descartes argued that reason alone determines knowledge and this can be done independently of the senses. He further contends that since conscious sense experience can be the cause of illusions, therefore all sense experience should be doubted. Rather, the thinking mind can operate under its own rules of logic to come to conclusions about that “other world”—the physical world.

Contrasting Descartes and Locke also had me wondering, how one can acquire knowledge without at least one sense? Perhaps some knowledge is indeed innate and does not require the senses, while gaining other types of knowledge does require the senses. Yet again, if one has none of the five senses, how can knowledge be acquired without the “input” senses of sight, sound, taste, and touch? Similarly, how can knowledge then be articulated (output) without hearing and the ability to either speak or write, or some other method to understand language and communicate (such as Helen Keller who used her sense of touch)? Ah, but perhaps these questions and more is why there has been a move away from the either-or arguments that characterized early epistemology to the newer more holistic ideas of epistemology. Further study will reveal more insights.

-Robin

References:

Aristotle. (1993). Posterior analytics (J. Barnes, Trans.). London: Clarendon Press. (Original work published 350 BC)

Descartes, R. (1644). Principles of philosophy. Retrieved September 3, 2007 from http://www.classicallibrary.org/descartes/principles/index.htm

Locke, J. (1689). In Essay concerning human understanding. Retrieved September 3, 2007 from http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/publications/locke_understanding.html

Plato. (1968). Republic (B. Jowett, Trans.). Public Domain. (Original work published 360 BC)

Copyright Robin Donnan 2007. All Rights Reserved.
Performance Associates, Inc.

Our journey into epistemology moves forward to the eighteenth century philosophers, Immanuel Kant and Jean Jacques Rousseau, who began to bring closer together the opposing ideas of the rationalists and empiricists. To explore these philosophers I considered the question of what are the pros and cons of having knowledge without experience? Interestingly, through this exploration, we’ll begin to see the roots of what modern theorists have been saying related to systems thinking, experiential learning, and the need to trigger the learner’s meta-cognition skills in order for knowledge to be retained.

The philosophers of the eighteenth century continued the debate about the nature of knowledge. Is it “a priori” and innate? Or is it “a posteriori” and gained through experience? If we look to two of the leading eighteenth century philosophers, Kant and Rousseau, we’ll see that they both lean toward the need for experiential acquisition of knowledge.

Rousseau argues that the learner should be a very active participant who learns driven by his own needs/interests and finding the answers for himself—NOT a receptacle for others’ learning, beliefs, and opinions. “It is for him to want to learn, to seek and to find it. You should put it within his reach, you should skillfully awaken the desire and supply within him the means for its satisfaction” (Rousseau, p142). The process Rousseau recommends by which the learner should acquire knowledge is very experiential. First, the learner should gain knowledge through the senses, observation, and experience. Then the learner should gradually gain the ability to focus on one thing for a long time (as driven by the learners’ interest—not an external mandate). Then the learner needs to apply these to “an honest trade” (and ensuring that he not acquire prejudices of his social or economic position). Then and only then, would the learner then proceed onto judgment and reasoning. As such, Rousseau lays out a process of knowledge acquisition that is very reliant upon experience.

In a similar vein, Kant argued for the physical training of both the mind and body. Kant recommends that body and senses should be trained through active doing (combining skill and senses), to develop a photographic memory (to be used in nature as well as in books and music), and to use childhood games to prepare children for the future and condition them to remain busy and work toward an end goal. Kant recommends that the mind also be trained, but receive both physical and moral training. Kant recommends that training of the mind should be done with consideration of the end goal—for work (scholastic culture) or play (free culture). Furthermore, Kant recommends to also train the memory early to cultivate understanding and to train rules (and their classes) alongside application/examples.

When considering these eighteenth century philosophers plus those who came before them, we can better weigh the pros and cons of having knowledge without experience. For example, to have knowledge not based upon experience may be desirable for (per Descartes) if your senses were deceived, then your knowledge would be compromised by that flawed experience. On the other hand, Rousseau teaches that not having knowledge based in experience will lack context and can be meaningless to the learner. And while Kant took a more moderate approach marrying the schools of empiricism and rationalism, he also believed that experience was a necessary component of knowledge. Kant asserts that experience (or training of the body) provides self-sufficiency, strength, skill, quickness, discipline, individuality, confidence, and the creation of a contributing/working member of society; these then provide a foundation for the training of the mind which provides understanding, judgment, reason, and morality.

Interestingly, in studying these eighteenth century philosophers we can begin to see the roots of what modern theorists have been saying related to systems thinking, experiential learning, and the need to trigger the learner’s meta-cognition skills in order for knowledge to be retained. Indeed, much can be learned from those who came before us—and I look forward to continuing this exploration and making further connections applicable to how today’s knowledge manager can maximize the acquisition of knowledge.

-Robin

References:

Descartes, R. (1644). Principles of philosophy. Retrieved September 3, 2007 from http://www.classicallibrary.org/descartes/principles/index.htm

Kant, I. (1960). Chapter 3: Instruction. In Education (pp. 58-65). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. (Original work published 1803)

Kant, I. (1960). Chapter 4: Cultivation of the mind. In Education (pp. 66-82). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. (Original work published 1803)

Rousseau, J.J. (1957). Book III. In B. Foxley (Translator), Emile (pp. ii-v,128-171). London: JM Dent and Sons. (Original work published 1762)

Copyright Robin Donnan 2007. All Rights Reserved.
Performance Associates, Inc.

We continue our journey through epistemology, now moving onto Phenomenology, Existentialism, and how a human being makes something a thing. To answer this quandary of what makes a thing’s “thingness,” we’ll apply Heidegger’s proposition that revolved around his example that a jug is a thing (and then his subsequent exploration of what comprised the jug’s jugness) and apply that to the Internet. Specifically, we’ll answer what is the Internet when described philosophically? And how does the Internet change our perception of nearness or farness?

First let’s try to answer the question of what is the Internet—from a strictly philosophical viewpoint. As explained by some doctoral student colleagues of mine, Heidegger proposed that “jugness is a combination of its substance and its usage”(Simmons et al., 2007). Thus, what makes a thing a thing is both its physical existence and its function. One might be able to say, then, that the Internet is a thing or a tool just like Heidegger’s jug, and that it can be defined both by its physical substance and its use.

So picking up on Heidegger’s concept of “being,” can we define Internet-ness by the thing itself and/or the user(s)? The use or function portion of the Internet is what we all bring to it as people; so that portion is in you, me, and everyone. It is something which many of us deal with every day. The question of what makes up the Internet’s physical existence, however, is much more complicated. There's the hardware which is located far and wide. But then, some of these physical aspects of the Internet are actually shared with other technologies such as telecommunications (i.e., phone line and cable which is used to transmit the data). With so much of that infrastructure not being unique to just the Internet, there is a challenge with whether or not the physical Internet infrastructure is indeed the substance portion of "internetness." So the challenge remains as to whether or not those parts of the physical infrastructure can be claimed as part of the "thing" that defines internetness.

But let’s move on now to the question of how does technology and the Internet change our perception of nearness or farness—perhaps in some ways similar to how does the jug change our perception of fullness or emptiness. In the opening to Heidegger’s “The Thing,” he states that “all distances in time and space are shrinking” (1971, p.165). He then goes on to explain how the prevalence of travel, radio, film, and television are furthering this shrinking. Considering the time when Heidegger wrote this piece, it is easy to reflect on even how much smaller the world has become now given the advent of the Internet and the ever-present mass media. We have access to more information now than any generation before us, yet can it be said that we are any more knowledgeable?

Then reflecting on the concepts of nearness and farness, one often hears of the globalization of society and how the world has shrunk. In fact out of curiosity, I ran a search on Amazon for the term “world has shrunk” and found over 200 book references! Indeed we can physically get from one point on the globe to another very quickly. We can also access through the Internet information from anywhere around the world, or even view other locations any time night or day. In fact, from < http://www.earthcam.com/mapsearch/> one can select any country in the world from which to locate and view available web cams.

Yet while we may have quicker physical access and greater informational access than ever before, Heidegger insightfully foretold that “the frantic abolition of all distance brings no nearness” and that “short distance is not in itself nearness, nor is great distance remoteness” (1971, p.165). If we reflect on these concepts of nearness and remoteness and try to glean their meanings, we find synonyms of isolation, seclusion, detachment, and inaccessibility. And consider these questions. While we have access, does the rest of the globe? Or are there whole sectors that are indeed isolated, secluded, detached, and inaccessible because they do not benefit from the same access to technology and the Internet that many of us do? And if whole sectors of the globe are not near to us, how can we be near to them? And even for those to whom we have the ability to be near, has this access really made us understand them better? Are we really any closer to other peoples and cultures today than we were when Heidegger wrote those words over 35 years ago?

It’s important to note that with these questions, I do not focus on just the domestic “digital divide” that one hears of in the media. Instead, I think it’s important to take a more global perspective on the question of technology and the Internet’s impact on our perception of nearness or farness. One of my concerns is that the Internet has given us a false sense of nearness, when indeed we are just as far as ever. For example, there are many challenges with technology when taken to a global scale—and these are challenges that are not always resolvable and have led to “pockets” within the overall Internet community. Besides the obvious language barriers, Laudon & Laudon report that many countries “lack the communications infrastructure for extensive Internet use, … [have] high transmission costs and lack of common technology, … [and have] low penetration of PCs and widespread illiteracy” (2006, pp. 584-585). In addition, there are different computing platforms and system standards, phone and other communication networks are not consistently reliable, and most countries outside the US have much slower data transfer speeds. When looking at the percentage of Internet users by country, Germany is the only one to come close to the US, with all other countries lagging far behind (Laudon & Laudon, 2006, p. 585). And even more disturbing is the fact that many countries monitor transmissions.

With these barriers in place, what we have on the Internet may actually be a perspective skewed toward the Western philosophies and policies of the countries that have the access. Thus the impression of it being a global Internet society may actually be false. Unfortunately, while technology and the Internet may have given us the appearance of greater accessibility and nearness around the globe, it may have actually done the opposite. On the contrary, it may have furthered the global divide between those who have (the technology) and those who don’t. And without education in how to be wise consumers of information, it may have furthered cultural misperceptions that force even greater distance between peoples and cultures.

-Robin

References:

Heidegger, M. (1971). The Thing. Public Domain, pp. 165-182. Retrieved from the Xanedu Course Pack for AMDS 8800. NAPC 2007.

Laudon, K., & Laudon, J. (2006). Management information systems: Managing the digital firm (9th ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education.

Simmons, T., Stevens, S., Toland, M., Ware, Y., Working, K., Young, J., & Zidonis, S. (2007). Heidegger's ontology: Phenomenology and existentialism. Unpublished manuscript. Walden University.

Copyright Robin Donnan 2007. All Rights Reserved.
Performance Associates, Inc.

For today’s post, we have a guest writer—Keith Donnan (our Technology Solutions Developer)—who just returned from the 2007 AdobeMAX show in Chicago where he was able to check out current and future solutions from Adobe. Take it away, Keith!

There was an incredible amount of software, technologies, and services to absorb. For the purposes of this update, we will focus on developments that affect e-learning, collaboration, and content delivery.

First, the message from Adobe regarding web-delivered content is:

1. Content is King—focus on content first; interaction flows from the content
2. Make the user experience personal
3. Less is (still) more—keep it simple
4. Movement has meaning; it provides orientation
5. Create an experience, not a user interface

The Adobe technologies that received the largest focus were:

• Adobe Integrated Runtime (AIR)—using existing web technologies to build a desktop application with web connectivity. Interestingly, there were over 300,000 downloads of AIR Beta on the first day it was available.

• Flash Player—supporting web video delivery better than ever. Currently 70% of video over the web is Flash video or .FLV files. A new version of Flash will be available in early 2008.

• Action Script 3.0—used in Flash and Flex (see below); a full programming language for the web. Delivers intricate yet efficient user experiences.

• Adobe Connect—Adobe’s web conference offering will shortly be completely modularized allowing the web developer to include any or all Connect components in their web applications. For example, the Adobe Connect chat window could be embedded inside an e-learning course allowing synchronous chat with other learners or experts without having to formally join a full Adobe Connect session.

• Flex 3—will be released shortly to provide an improved development environment for web applications.

Some exciting new developments to look forward to:

• Adobe has purchased Buzzword and will be offering Buzzword as an on-line (Word compatible) shared document development tool. Teams will be able to work on documents together in real time!

• Adobe is working on a document sharing service, currently called Share, for controlled sharing of documents with designated individuals. Features could include 1 gigabyte of online storage, extensive sharing controls, secure document access, and the ability to have documents expire (i.e., become unusable) after specific dates—even after a user downloads the document.

Overall, my experience at AdobeMAX 2007 was very positive and the future bodes well for how Adobe’s products will help collaboration, content delivery, and e-learning efforts. After speaking with product development people from Adobe, the impression is that Adobe has increased funding of its product development efforts and that the employees are excited about the future of the company. Adobe’s products continue to be amongst the best in the marketplace and moving to Action Script 3.0 has provided a much improved foundation for Adobe’s web technologies and tools. Looking ahead, I eagerly anticipate developing AIR-based projects, and providing the next generation of user experience with Adobe’s tools.

- Keith

Copyright Keith Donnan 2007. All Rights Reserved.
Performance Associates, Inc.

We continue our journey through epistemology, now moving onto Pragmatism. We’ll explore how James’s metaphysical pragmatism can be applied to non-metaphysical truth and practices in furthering knowledge in the workplace—specifically, how to manage information overload and maximize individual learning.

Between the Internet and company Intranets, today’s knowledge workers have access to a vast amount of information. James’s theory of truth may provide some guidance to today’s knowledge workers in helping them sift through that information—in the form of criteria by which to evaluate truth. In this way, James can help us with how we can further knowledge in the workplace. For example, one can look to James’s criteria of instrumental truth to help define what is the truth—or perhaps what could be considered the most correct knowledge—for that workplace. That is, each idea or belief could be evaluated in light of its ability to link the employee’s, department’s, and/or company’s experience and their ‘power to work’ (James, 1907, p. 23).

While helping further workplace knowledge, it is important to remember that truth is very subjective to each individual or entity. As James states in citing the ideas of Schiller and Dewey, “…ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience” (1907, p. 23). Echoing Kant’s belief that “no mental faculty is to be cultivated by itself, but always in relation to others” (1960, p.71), James also teaches us that we acquire new beliefs and ideas through the linking or ‘grafting’ of new knowledge onto previous. As new knowledge is acquired, it is done so in relation to what we already know, and in forming these new truths our old ideas and beliefs are forever changed (James, 1907, p. 24). James also—like Rousseau—cautions us that a person must want to acquire new ideas; that “a new opinion counts as ‘true’ just in proportion as it gratifies the individual’s desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock” (1907, p. 25).

Perhaps the answer to furthering knowledge in the workplace is not to rely solely on compulsory training for delivering the “truth”, but rather to also equip knowledge workers with the tools, ability, and opportunities to make linkages for themselves and evaluate their own important truths in context of the ideas and beliefs of them individually and as a member of their workplace. This sentiment is supported in Jay Cross’s new book Informal Learning where in discussing the future of work he states, “As we enter an age of informal and workflow learning, authority is less centralized than ever before” (2007, p. 7). He further goes on to quote Etienne Wenger (noted expert on communities of practices) who states, “Learning is best understood as an interaction among practitioners, rather than a process in which a producer provides knowledge to a consumer” (Wenger as quoted in Cross, 2007, p. 7).

But how can organizations provide these tools, ability, and opportunities? Fostering knowledge networks can help, plus maximizing informal learning. Since informal learning is how we naturally learn the best/most, as knowledge managers we need to maximize these opportunities and help people to be able to utilize their networks to improve their potential learning. For example, “Learning is optimizing our connections to the networks that matter to us. This satisfies both the community concept of learning (social networking) and the knowledge aspect (gaining access to information and fitting it into the patterns in one’s head)” (Cross, 2007, p. 19). The form the tools and opportunities take will vary but can include such things as communities of practice, collaborative software tools, and corporate yellow pages / expert finders. Importantly, it also needs to include making physical space within organizations to encourage sharing plus supporting employees in making the time to share.

-Robin

References:

Cross, J. (2007). Informal learning. San Francisco: Pfeiffer.

James, W. (1907). Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking. In The matter of belief: Selected works of William James. Retrieved from http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject

Kant, I. (1960). Chapter 4: Cultivation of the mind. In Education (pp. 66-82). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. (Original work published 1803)

Rousseau, J.J. (1957). Book III. In B. Foxley (Translator), Emile (pp. ii-v,128-171). London: JM Dent and Sons. (Original work published 1762)

Copyright Robin Donnan 2007. All Rights Reserved.
Performance Associates, Inc.

As we continue our journey through epistemology, we will consider the theories of Rogers (Humanism) and Skinner (Behaviorism) and explore how they each contributed to the process of training analysis.

Beginning in the 1960s, Skinner’s emphasis on observing actual behaviors and modifying it through operant conditioning led to the method of programmed instruction. This approach involved the breaking down of learning into small pieces, and then providing instruction, practice, and reinforcement on each piece. Behaviorism’s operant conditioning (i.e., ignoring undesirable responses and reinforcing desirable ones) can particularly be found in many of today’s technology-enabled courses that utilize feedback loops and custom pathing through the learning experience based on the learner’s responses.

Echoing elements of both Rousseau and Kant, 1970s humanist psychologists Rogers and Maslow provided additional insights into what motivates people to learn. Maslow, with the concept of striving for self-actualization, encouraged educators to help learners make choices on their own. Rogers encouraged a learner-centered approach that empowered learners to develop the skills and self-confidence to educate themselves (i.e., the skills of meta-learning). He also echoed pragmatist believes about the discomfort that must come as part of the process of new learning (James, 1907, p. 24; Rogers, 1961, p. 187). Rogers further encouraged us to remember that learning is both intellectual and behavioral by stating, “It is not simply an intellectual value choice, but seems to be the description of the…behaviors by which [the learner] moves exploringly toward what he wants to be” (1961, p. 176).

As we look at instructional systems design and other processes used by many of today’s workplace learning and performance improvement professionals, one can see many Behaviorism and Humanist influences. Humanism provides us with greater insight into the individual learner—which is considered via target audience analysis and identifying the learners’ potential affective goals plus any motivational and/or environmental barriers that may impede the learner. On the other hand, Behaviorism emphasizes that what is important is that the learner can actually display the behavior or perform. From this, comes the development of performance objectives that focus on observable behaviors. Also included is performance gap analysis, which identifies the differences between the current performance/observable behavior and what is desired. In addition, Behaviorism’s operant conditioning can also be seen in the design of during and post-training activities that facilitate and reinforce the learning process. Operant conditioning can also be seen in implementation considerations, such as when analysis reveals that a company’s rewards and recognition structure needs to be re-worked in order to ensure learning transfer.

-Robin

References:

James, W. (1907). Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking. In The matter of belief: Selected works of William James. Retrieved from http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject

Rogers, C. (1961). Chapter 6: What it means to become a person. In On becoming a person: A therapist’s view of psychotherapy. pp 107-124. Houghton-Mifflin Company, Trade & Reference Division. Electronic reprint from Xanedu Course Packs.

Rogers, C. (1961). Chapter 8: To be that self which one truly is: A therapist’s view of personal goals. In On becoming a person: A therapist’s view of psychotherapy. pp 163-182. Houghton-Mifflin Company, Trade & Reference Division. Electronic reprint from Xanedu Course Packs.

Rogers, C. (1961). Chapter 9: A therapist’s view of the good life: The fully functioning person. In On becoming a person: A therapist’s view of psychotherapy. pp 183 - 196. Houghton-Mifflin Company, Trade & Reference Division. Electronic reprint from Xanedu Course Packs.

Skinner, B. F. (1971). A technology of behavior. In Beyond Freedom and Dignity (chap. 1). Retrieved from http://www.xanedu.com/

Skinner, B. F. (1971). A technology of behavior. In Beyond Freedom and Dignity (chap. 2). Retrieved from http://www.xanedu.com/

Skinner, B. F. (1971). A technology of behavior. In Beyond Freedom and Dignity (chap. 3). Retrieved from http://www.xanedu.com/

Copyright Robin Donnan 2007. All Rights Reserved.
Performance Associates, Inc.

Today we’ll look to epistemology to see if we can answer the question of which is more important – theory knowledge or practical knowledge.

Theory knowledge provides the legitimacy of facts, rules, and concepts founded upon research. As Schwan states, its “strength and value…lie in its generality, system, and economy” (1971, p. 62). But it is this generality which causes difficulty, for practice—in contrast—requires the concrete and particular. Unfortunately, as Schon points out, research and theory also are being increasingly criticized for not meeting “the needs and interests of professional practitioners” (1987, p. 10) and that curriculums too entrenched in theory may not adequately prepare professionals for practice in their field (1987, pp. 11-12). Schwab (1971) echoes Schon’s points with his own concerns about theoretical approaches being inadequate to helping prepare professionals to solve and apply practical solutions.

On the other hand, Schon describes how practical knowledge provides experience and skill in problem solving—resulting in the artistry by which the seasoned professional practices his trade. Practical knowledge also provides the opportunity to build what Schon terms ‘knowledge-in-action’ — the ability to apply tacit knowledge and make wise judgments in the light of new problems and situations (1987, pp. 23-25). Practical experience can also provide the opportunity for ‘reflection in action’ — a series of evaluations, learnings, and modifications that are made in the midst of practice (Schon, 1987, pp. 26-29). With these two concepts and techniques in place, the artistry of professional practice can be realized and observed.

In exploring this challenge of theory versus practice, Schwan cautions that we will perform (or practice) well only to the degree to which we consider the conditions to which the theory is to be applied. Furthermore, Schwan recommends that we not accept any single theory, but rather apply multiple theories to paint a more complete picture or more accurate assessment of a situation. Much like the scholar-practitioner model followed at Walden University, perhaps the solution lies in the enquiry cycle of learning existing theories, exploring the boundaries and limitations of those theories, and then exploring new directions through practical application.

Then to address the question of which is more important — theory knowledge or practical knowledge — perhaps we can consider that while both are important, they can successfully operate independent of one another. For example, a person can successfully acquire or apply practical knowledge without conscious knowledge of the underlying theory. At the same time, a person can successfully acquire and focus on theoretical knowledge without ever venturing into the practical knowledge. It may, however, be argued that the more defensible and rewarding method would be to blend the two approaches. As Schon states, “rigorous professional practitioners solve well-formed instrumental problems by applying [both] theory and technique” (Schon, 1987, pp. 3-4).

Another question we may want to consider is which should come first —theoretical knowledge or practical knowledge. While not wanting to digress into a chicken-or-the-egg-type debate, it could be interesting to consider which would be the best to lead with in helping others acquire new knowledge and skills. Is it best to lead with theoretical knowledge and then provide opportunity for practice based on the theory? Or is it best to lead with practice and then debrief what did and didn’t work and share potential reasons based on the theory? Perhaps the answer lies in learning theory and individual learning styles and preferences. Also perhaps a question of emphasis on theory versus practical knowledge can be answered in a matching to the desired behavioral outcome. This could be related to the concepts of ‘know how’ versus ‘know why’ being discussed in current literature. Perhaps it can also be related to cognitive levels where theory and the ability to create the tools that allow individuals to perform their task is a higher-order cognitive skill versus practical knowledge and using the knowledge to perform tasks may be at a different/lower level—or perhaps even be in the psychomotor rather than cognitive domain.

-Robin

References:

Schon, D.A. (1987). Educating the reflective practitioner: Toward a new design for teaching and learning in the professions. Reprint in CoursePack at www.xanedu.com: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Schwab, J. J. (1971). The practical: Arts of eclectic. In School review (pp. 493-542). Reprint in CoursePack at www.xanedu.com: University of Chicago Press Journals.

Copyright Robin Donnan 2007. All Rights Reserved.
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